Gulf Corridors Monitor

On day 252 of the war, the Gulf corridors remain effectively closed to normal commercial traffic.

Day 252Issue of Friday, 6 November 2026
Live feeds refreshed 6 Nov, 06:15 Israel time
No data this run: OpenSky
Archived issue. Read the latest issue.
1 of 6 · Is the Strait of Hormuz open?

1. Is the Strait of Hormuz open?

Barely: 3 ships a day against 85 before the war.

3.3from 3.7
Transits a day, seven-day average
IMF PortWatch, to 25 Oct (12 days ago)
~34
Hormuz transits (US-facilitated)
101 over 22-24 Oct; 138 a day before the war. JMIC via gCaptain, 26 Oct
492
Vessels waiting outside Hormuz
Fujairah, Khor Fakkan anchorages. JMIC, 25 Oct
28+
Attacks on shipping, Oct
first half of October, a record month. Lloyd's List, UKMTO, 22 Oct

PortWatch counts ships whose AIS transponders are on and publishes with a lag of one to two weeks. JMIC’s count includes escorted convoys, so the two figures differ; both are shown with their dates.

Strait of Hormuz, vessels a day IMF PortWatch, to 25 Oct

Latest day: 2 vessels (1 tankers, 0 container, 0 dry bulk). Seven-day average 3.3 against 3.7 the week before, 4% of the pre-crisis 85 a day.

Bab el-Mandeb, vessels a day IMF PortWatch, to 25 Oct

Latest day: 36 vessels (13 tankers, 9 container, 7 dry bulk). Seven-day average 28.9 against 26.4 the week before, 48% of the pre-crisis 60 a day.

Suez Canal, vessels a day IMF PortWatch, to 25 Oct

Latest day: 46 vessels (14 tankers, 19 container, 8 dry bulk). Seven-day average 41.3 against 44.3 the week before, 69% of the pre-crisis 60 a day.

Chokepoints and bypasses as of 26 Oct

RouteStatusLatest
Strait of HormuzContestedIran declares it closed; US escorts about 34 ships a day; mines, projectiles, GPS interference. JMIC threat level "severe".
Bab el-MandebHigh riskHouthis hold Perim, Hanish and the Yemeni coast; Saudi port blockade declared 20 Jul. No vessel attacks reported in September; Riyadh and Dammam airports struck 10-12 Oct.
Suez CanalRecoveringMaersk and Hapag-Lloyd return AE12 and SE1 services to Suez from 27 Oct. Canal revenue still depressed.
Saudi East-West pipeline (Yanbu)DamagedConverted to full crude capacity 11 Mar; pumping station struck 10 Sep; European refiners told to expect no Saudi crude in October.
UAE Habshan-FujairahOperatingPrimary UAE bypass; Fujairah anchorage congested.
Cape of Good HopeDefault+10-14 days Asia-Europe; container lines only now rotating back to Suez.

Net effect: Gulf crude shipments reached 75-81% of pre-war levels in September (IEA, Kpler) and Middle East exports via all routes exceeded pre-war volumes in the week to 18 Oct. Volume has largely recovered; cost, insurance and reliability have not. The IMF expects normalization through 2027, not a snap-back.

Airspace over the Gulf states and Israel: OpenSky returned no samples this run; the same-hour baseline builds over a week of samples.

2. What does a barrel cost to move?

Brent is $107.03 a barrel, and Hormuz war-risk cover runs 6-10% of hull value per transit.

$107.03-13.1% on the week
Brent, dollars a barrel
EIA via FRED, 3 Nov (3 days ago)
$138.21
52-week high
2026 average $96.5; -21% in 30 days
6-10%
Hormuz war-risk premium
of hull value per transit; 0.25% before the war. FT broker quotes, early Oct
~$35
Gulf-China VLCC freight a barrel, ~$7 of it war-risk
Broker quotes, October 2026

A $100M tanker now pays $6-10M in war-risk cover per Hormuz transit, against about $250,000 before the war. Freight benchmarks are quoted before war-risk, so headline tanker rates understate the delivered cost. Container lines charge about $1,000 per box for a Hormuz transit; some discharge at Fujairah and truck to Jebel Ali.

Brent crude, dollars a barrel EIA via FRED, to 3 Nov

52-week high $138.21. EIA’s October outlook has $105 in Q4 2026 and $84 in 2027; the gap to the forward curve is the deal-or-no-deal spread. FRED publishes with about a week’s lag.

What a barrel pays to leave the Gulf October 2026

Hormuz war-risk premium
6-10% hull
Pre-war war-risk premium
0.25% hull
Yanbu (Red Sea) war-risk
~3% hull
Bab el-Mandeb war-risk
~0.5% hull
Gulf-China VLCC freight
~$35/bbl
Of which war-risk
~$7/bbl

3. What do markets expect for the truce?

Polymarket returned no prices this run.

45.5%
Israel-Iran truce still holding on 31 December
$46.5M across the event
10.5%
Hormuz traffic back to normal by 31 December
Resolves on IMF PortWatch

“Ceasefire continues” on Polymarket means no US (or Israeli) air or missile strike on Iranian territory by that date. It does not mean a deal, and it does not cover the maritime war.

Odds the truce survives to each date Polymarket, 6 Nov, 06:15 Israel time

Related contracts Yes price, change over 7 days in points

MarketByYes7-day
US announces the end of the blockadeNov 158.5%-10.5
Nov 3021.5%-7
Mar 3169.5%+9
US-Iran Hormuz agreementNov 60.6%
Nov 3017.5%-6
Dec 3136.5%+3
Iran damages undersea cablesDec 3111.5%-14
Bab el-Mandeb effectively closedOct 310.2%-0.3
Nov 303.8%-2.7
Dec 317.5%-7
US-Iran ceasefire datesThrough the midtermsIsrael-Iran ceasefire datesHormuz normal by 31 DecEnd of blockadeHormuz agreementUndersea cablesBab el-Mandeb closed

Prices are Yes-share midpoints read as probabilities, refreshed once a day. Contracts under $100K move on single trades. We use the prices, not Polymarket’s auto-generated commentary.

4. What does it mean for my corridor?

Severe for the Gulf, elevated for Israel and Europe, mixed for Latin America.

Our reading of each corridor, up or down for business, as of 26 Oct.

Israel Elevated

  • Down for business: Israel is a planning partner for any post-midterm strike package; Netanyahu ordered strike preparations in early October, blocked by Washington at the last minute (JPost, CFR).
  • Down for business: Iranian threat to widen targeting to data centers and undersea cables: direct exposure for Israel's tech and cloud sector and for Med-Red Sea connectivity.
  • Down for business: Houthi control of Bab el-Mandeb keeps Eilat and the Red Sea leg of the Asia-Israel route at risk; Ashdod and Haifa via Suez or the Cape remain the working routes.
  • To watch: Lebanon front active since 2 Mar; Qatar funding southern Lebanon reconstruction (16 Oct).
  • To watch: Knesset election 27 Oct: the outcome shapes Israel's posture in the November window.

Latin America Mixed

  • Up for business: Net exporters win on terms of trade: Brazil, Guyana, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela. Petrobras, YPF and Ecopetrol rallied with Brent on 23 Oct. Guyana GDP forecast +16% in 2026.
  • Up for business: Atlantic-basin barrels are structurally more valuable to Europe and Asia; LATAM was already the main source of non-OPEC supply growth in 2026.
  • Down for business: Mexico exports crude but imports about half its gasoline; refined-product bills and the trade balance deteriorate even as Pemex export sales rose 31% y/y in Q2.
  • Down for business: Brazil fertilizer exposure: 41% of urea imports transited Hormuz pre-war, 36% sourced from Gulf producers; yield risk for 2026/27 soy if supply stays tight.
  • Down for business: Central America and the Caribbean: fuel importers with no commodity offset; currency and food inflation pressure.
  • Down for business: US "economic D-Day" sanctions (24 Aug) raise secondary-sanctions risk for LATAM banks, shippers and traders touching Iranian cargoes.

Europe and EMEA Elevated

  • Down for business: Saudi crude to Europe interrupted: at least two European refiners told they get no Saudi barrels in October after the East-West pipeline strike.
  • Down for business: Diesel market extremely tight (EIA): refinery margins squeezed by record freight; the IMF sees core inflation back at 2% only by mid-2028 in the US and Europe.
  • Down for business: Egypt absorbs four shocks at once: energy import bill, Suez revenue, wheat prices, remittances.
  • To watch: Hapag-Lloyd and Maersk Suez returns from 27 Oct are the first sign of Red Sea normalization for Asia-Med trade; watch whether they hold through November.
  • To watch: Spain and the Western Med gain relative position as Atlantic LNG and LATAM crude entry points.

Gulf (GCC) Severe

  • Down for business: IMF: GCC GDP -4.8% in 2026 (cut by 6.8 points since April); non-oil economy -0.8%; MENA plus Pakistan -1.3%.
  • Down for business: Qatar: state revenues down 42% in H1 after strikes on energy facilities; LNG exports constrained; a Qatari LNG carrier was hit on 7 Jul.
  • Down for business: Desalination plants struck: water security risk in Kuwait and Qatar (99% of drinking water).
  • Down for business: Saudi Arabia: Riyadh and Dammam airports hit by Houthi missiles 10-12 Oct (12+ killed); Red Sea port blockade.
  • Up for business: Rebound of +9.1% in 2027 projected if hostilities end and Hormuz reopens in early 2027; large reconstruction and resilience spend (pipelines, desalination, air defense).
Want this read for your own routes, suppliers and contracts? We run corridor-specific reviews.Talk to SymbioLAB

5. Which way does November go?

Budget for frozen attrition: Brent $100-120, Hormuz 20-40/day.

Our judgment, not a forecast and not a market price.

Deal and phased reopening

Trigger7-day planUS lifts the blockade, Hormuz reopens day 6, talks day 7
Brent path$85-100toward the EIA 2027 average of $84 over 2-3 months
Hormuz60-100/dayPGSA permits likely persist; insurance lags by weeks
Corridor winnersGCC, Egypt, AsiaLATAM oil premium fades
What it looks likeA Pakistan- or Qatar-mediated sequence similar to June. Insurers reprice slowly (the June reopening lasted three weeks), so the first 30-60 days still carry elevated cost. The nuclear file is unresolved; Rubio and Vance insist on a "meaningful" enrichment cut and Tehran says it will never give up enrichment, which is why this scenario is fragile.
For our clientsLock in Gulf-route freight and cover early in the window; do not unwind Atlantic sourcing (LATAM crude, US LNG) until the memorandum survives 60 days. Israeli firms with Gulf partners: expect re-engagement to lag the political signal by a quarter.

Frozen attrition

Budget for this one
TriggerNo decisionTalks continue, strikes deferred, blockade holds
Brent path$100-120EIA Q4 base case $105; spikes on each incident
Hormuz20-40/dayescorted convoys only; queue stays above 400
Corridor winnersBrazil, Guyana, Atlantic LNGlosers: Mexico refined, Central America, Egypt
What it looks likeThe October pattern extends: Iran attacks to restore leverage, the US blockade strangles Iranian exports (floating stocks depleting since July), the Houthis keep Saudi Red Sea ports under threat. Volumes hold near 80% of pre-war via bypasses; cost and unreliability become the permanent tax. GCC contraction deepens, reconstruction spend is deferred.
For our clientsThis is the scenario to budget for. Price contracts with war-risk pass-through clauses (CONWARTIME-type), diversify fertilizer and petrochemical sourcing for LATAM agriculture, and treat Gulf-dependent supply chains as a 2027 problem, not a Q4 2026 one.

"Epic Fury 2"

TriggerPost 3 Nov strikesenergy, nuclear, missile and drone sites
Brent path$130+retest of the April high ($138); diesel spike
Hormuz<10/dayrenewed mining; Gulf infrastructure and Israel targeted
New vectorCables, data centersIranian threat reported 22 Oct
What it looks likeA short, intense campaign aimed at cratering Iran's economy to force concessions. Iran's stated response is to broaden targets from ships and energy to data centers and undersea cables, which puts Gulf cloud regions, Red Sea and Med cable landings, and Israel's digital infrastructure in scope. Expect Israeli home-front alerts, Gulf airport closures, a Houthi surge in the Red Sea, and a 10-14 day shipping freeze.
For our clientsPre-position: cyber and continuity plans for Gulf and Israel operations (we cover this through Cybool), cash and inventory buffers for Central American and Caribbean importers, and a review of any exposure to Gulf-based data hosting. Latin American exporters gain again, but the IMF-modelled $2.2T global hit from a renewed war would hit demand for their non-oil exports in 2027.

6. What do I watch this week?

No dated events ahead; 4 signals to track.

27 OCT
Israel Knesset election
Coalition outcome sets Israel's posture for the November window. Live odds on our tracker.
27 OCT
Maersk / Hapag-Lloyd back in Suez
First AE12 and SE1 transits; a Houthi incident would reverse the Red Sea return.
28 OCT
EIA weekly stocks
Inventory draws plus 100M bbl of IEA releases still to come; 40M bbl of SPR exchanges already in the base case.
3 NOV
US midterm elections
The stated hinge for a strike decision. Trump: "another little Epic Fury, or they'll agree."
ROLLING
Islamabad / Doha channel
Iran's seven-day plan vs US enrichment demands. Any lifting of the port blockade is the tell.
ROLLING
JMIC daily transit count
Escorted transits above 50/day or the queue below 300 would signal de-escalation.
ROLLING
Hormuz war-risk quotes
Brokers reprice every 24h; a move below 3% of hull is the market calling a deal.
ROLLING
Embassy and troop drawdowns
State Department cut staffing at four more Middle East posts last week; the same pattern preceded 28 Feb.

The assessment in full

On day 252 of the war, the Gulf corridors remain effectively closed to normal commercial traffic. Escorted transits run at about 34 a day against 138 before the war, and 492 ships wait at the Fujairah and Khor Fakkan anchorages (JMIC, late October). War risk cover costs 6 to 10% of hull value per transit, up from 0.25% before the war. The IMF sees GCC output contracting by 4.8% this year.

This week's feeds show prices easing faster than shipping is recovering. PortWatch counted 2 Hormuz transits on 25 October, its latest reading, and an average of 3.3 a day over the last seven days versus 3.7 the week before: 4% of the prewar 85. Brent stood at $107.03 on 3 November, down 13.1% in seven days and 21% in thirty, well off its $138.21 high. We have no airspace reading this week.

The November window turns on whether the truces hold, and markets are skeptical. Prediction markets priced the chance of a US truce holding through the 3 November midterms at 0%. They put an Israel and Iran truce still holding on 31 December at 45.5%, and normal Hormuz traffic by then at only 10.5%. We would plan for constrained Gulf routing through year end, with the IMF's projected 9.1% GCC rebound in 2027, if the war ends, as the upside case.

Written from the figures on this page and checked against them, number by number. Reported figures are as of 26 October 2026; live feeds refreshed 6 Nov, 06:15 Israel time. Not refreshed this run: portwatch:hormuz, airspace. This is the archived issue of 6 November 2026. Read the latest issue. Prior issue: 5 Nov.

Background

How the war reached this point, what it has cost in lives, and the macro outlook. Kept here for reference; it changes slowly.

How we got here: 5 phases since 28 February
  1. 1
    Epic Fury / Roaring Lion
    28 Feb - 8 Apr
    US-Israeli air campaign; Khamenei killed on day one, Mojtaba Khamenei succeeds. About 13,500 targets and 36,000 sorties. Iran closes Hormuz on 2 Mar and hits the Gulf states and Israel.
  2. 2
    Ceasefire and blockade
    8 Apr - 17 Jun
    Pakistan-brokered two-week ceasefire, extended indefinitely on 21 Apr. Islamabad talks fail 11-12 Apr; US blockade of Iranian ports from 13 Apr. Epic Fury formally ended 5 May. Iran creates the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (transit permits).
  3. 3
    Islamabad Memorandum
    17 Jun - 8 Jul
    MoU signed, blockade lifted, Strait reopens 18-19 Jun. Brent falls to about $72 by 1 Jul. Collapses after Iran strikes three vessels including a Qatari LNG carrier on 7 Jul.
  4. 4
    Maritime attrition war
    8 Jul - today
    US strikes 7-31 Jul, blockade resumes 14 Jul. Houthis blockade Saudi ports (20 Jul) and seize Yemen's Red Sea coast (Sep). East-West pipeline struck 10 Sep. October: record attacks on shipping; Riyadh airport hit.
  5. 5
    Decision window
    3 Nov onward
    Post-midterm strike plans drafted (NYT, 22 Oct). Iran's seven-day reopening plan still on offer. Either a deal and phased reopening, or "Epic Fury 2" with energy and nuclear targets.

Timeline

  1. 28 FebWar begins. US-Israeli strikes kill Supreme Leader Khamenei; Mojtaba Khamenei succeeds. Hezbollah joins 2 Mar.
  2. 2 MarIRGC closes Hormuz to "unfriendly nations". Transits fall to 1-2 a day by 9 Mar.
  3. 11 MarSaudi East-West pipeline switched to full crude capacity; Bab el-Mandeb oil flows +21% vs February.
  4. 8 AprTwo-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan, extended indefinitely on 21 Apr. Islamabad talks fail 11-12 Apr; US naval blockade of Iran from 13 Apr.
  5. 5 MayPentagon declares Operation Epic Fury concluded; "Project Freedom" escort operation 4-6 May. Iran sets up the Persian Gulf Strait Authority.
  6. 17 JunIslamabad Memorandum signed; blockade lifted; Strait reopens 18-19 Jun; Brent near $72 by 1 Jul.
  7. 7-8 JulIran strikes three vessels including a Qatari LNG carrier; memorandum collapses; US strikes 7-31 Jul; blockade resumes 14 Jul.
  8. 20 JulHouthis declare a blockade of Saudi ports; Hormuz war-risk cover at 3-10% of hull.
  9. 24 AugUS "economic D-Day" sanctions package; rial at about 2.02M per dollar; PGSA blacklists 45 tankers.
  10. SepHouthis take Yemen's Red Sea coast, Perim and Hanish; East-West pipeline pumping station struck 10 Sep. Iran tables a seven-day Hormuz plan at UNGA; Trump rejects it.
  11. 10-14 OctSupertankers hit mines; Riyadh and Dammam airports struck (12+ killed); two container ships sink. Trump cancels a planned US-Israeli strike at the last minute.
  12. 22-26 OctNYT: post-midterm strike plans drafted. Brent $116.72 on 23 Oct, highest since 2022. Trump: "another little Epic Fury, or they'll agree." Tanker disabled in Hormuz 26 Oct.
The human cost
PartyFigureSource
US service members21 killed, 865 woundedPentagon DCAS, 9-10 Oct
US aircraft lost or damaged81 (45 MQ-9, KC-135 crash 12 Mar)CRS, 5 Oct
Iran, total killed3,636 (1,701 civilians) to 3,724+HRANA; JINSA
Iran, civilians (government figure)2,362+ killed, 32,314+ injuredIran MoH
Gulf states, civilians43-51 killedCompiled, The National
Seafarers24 killed + 1 port workerHormuz crisis tally
Hezbollah fighters1,000-2,500 (disputed)LWJ, ToI
All parties9,000-18,000 killedAggregator range, 9 Oct
Iran missile launchers destroyed60 TELs (verified)WaPo, 9 Oct
US blockade tally4 disabled, 135 turned back, 10 shadow tankers destroyedCENTCOM, early Oct

Contested figures. Pentagon casualty data has been revised without explanation several times since April (The Intercept, 12 Oct). We show the official figure and flag that it is contested. Iranian civilian tolls are unverifiable, and the December 2025 to February 2026 protest massacres (3,117 official to 36,500 estimated) are a separate count.

Macro scorecard, IMF and EIA
Indicator20262027Note
Global GDP growth3.1% (3.0% in some outlooks)modest recoveryCut 0.2 pts in April, further in October; AI capex partly offsets the oil shock
Global headline inflation4.7%-Up from 4.1% in 2025; core back to 2% only by mid-2028 in the US and Europe
GCC GDP-4.8%+9.1%Non-oil -0.8% then +4.5%; rebound assumes Hormuz reopens early 2027
MENA + Pakistan GDP-1.3%+6.6%Energy, shipping, tourism and sentiment channels
Brent average (EIA)$96$84Q4 2026 at $105; diesel tightness adds crude demand
Guyana GDP+16.2%-Pure windfall: no domestic fuel subsidy, exports nearly all output
Resumed-war cost (GPI model)$2.2 trillion-Global Peace Index 2026 scenario for full resumption

Method and sources

Live feeds. IMF PortWatch for daily chokepoint transits (also Polymarket’s resolution source); OpenSky Network for ADS-B aircraft counts and Polymarket’s public API for prices, both read once a day; FRED for Brent. Each feed’s publication lag is shown next to its figure.

Rules. Every number carries its source and date. Where sources disagree we show the range, not a midpoint. The answers at the top of each question are built from that week’s figures. The scenarios and corridor readings are our judgment and say so. Nothing here is investment, legal or operational advice.

Cadence. One data run a day at 06:15 Israel time reads every feed and rewrites the assessment. Reported figures (JMIC counts, war-risk quotes, casualties, the IMF outlook) are updated by hand and dated.

Reuse. The figures are public as JSON at /api/geo-latest and may be cited with credit: SymbioLAB, Gulf Corridors Monitor.

All 31 sources